The Image of Imam al-Hasan’s (peace be upon him) Life during the Rule of Those Who Assumed Authority after the Death of the Messenger of God (ﷺ) and up to the Caliphate of Imam Ali (peace be upon him)in the Book Jumal min Ansāb al-Ashrāf by al-Balādhurī

The personality of Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) is considered one of the central figures in the Islamic history, particularly during the period that followed the death of the Messenger of God, Muhammad (ﷺ), and prior to his own assumption of authority, as this period was marked by profound political and social transformations. This period attracted the attention of historians, among them al-Balādhurī in his book Jumal min Ansāb al-Ashrāf, in which he presented an image of Imam al-Hasan within a genealogical and historical context that reflects his methodological approach and sources.The researcher notes, based on a study of al-Balādhurī’s methodology which does not differ significantly from that of other historians, that many of the virtues and merits bestowed upon Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), especially during the period from the death of the Prophet (ﷺ) until the caliphate of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), were deliberately obscured. This concealment was carried out by the Umayyad ideological system and later inherited and continued by the Abbasids. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the researcher to examine these narrations critically, analyze them, and compare them with what is found in other sources. Although some details of these narrations do appear in other historical works, we do not observe any substantial role played by al-Balādhurī in recording these events—particularly those related to the life of Imam al-Hasan during the reigns of the caliphs ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān. These narrations reflect the religious, social, and political thought directed toward Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him).

 

This research aims to study the portrayal of Imam al-Hasan’s life during this period through al-Balādhurī’s narrations, by means of a critical and analytical reading that reveals the nature of the historical narrative, the limits of its objectivity, and its political and social implications, particularly concerning the nature of the relationship that accompanied those transformations between Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) and those who assumed authority after the martyrdom of the Messenger of God (ﷺ). The importance of this study lies in rereading this period as an independent historical moment that contributes to a deeper understanding of Imam al-Hasan’s personality. The researcher has worked to transmit and analyze these narrations through a systematic and realistic methodology, characterized by objectivity and the avoidance of ideological or doctrinal bias, in order to reconstruct the true image that al-Balādhurī neglected.

 

The researcher observes that the early life of Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), as presented in historical writings in general, and in al-Balādhurī’s work in particular, tends to depict a stereotypical image that does not differ greatly across sources. This depiction presents two images. The first is relatively clear: the period he lived under the care of his grandfather, the Messenger of God (ﷺ), and within the care of his parents, highlighting the extent of the attention and nurturing that surrounded him. This care played a major role in the formation and development of his personality in all aspects. If this image is clear, the second image which is related to the life of Imam al-Hasan beginning with the death of the Messenger of God (ﷺ) and the establishment of what became known as the "Rightly Guided Caliphate"is marked by a striking scarcity of narrations in al-Balādhurī and other historians. This scarcity makes it extremely difficult for the researcher to draw a picture that approximates historical reality.In truth, this situation is surprising. We are accustomed to encountering such treatment in historical records concerning members of obscure families, not the sons of well-known lineages, so how much more astonishing it is in the case of Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), who descended from the Muhammadan household: his grandfather the Messenger of God (ﷺ), and his parents Imam Ali and al-Zahra (peace be upon them). However, this astonishment dissipates when we consider certain constants that have surrounded Islamic history. The first is that historical writing was influenced by political authority and tailored to align with its orientations. The second is that the history of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) in general suffered severe injustice. Evidence confirming this is abundant and readily available to any researcher who approaches the subject with objectivity and a genuine pursuit of truth. By way of example, not exhaustively, Muʿāwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān sent a letter to all his governors across the provinces threatening anyone who narrated or transmitted reports mentioning the virtues of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them). The text of the letter reads:“Liability is absolved from anyone who narrates a report concerning the merits of Ali ibn Abi Talib or the virtues of his household, and he himself has rendered punishment lawful upon himself.” (1)

 

The Abbasid authority that succeeded the Umayyads did not deviate from this approach in its attempts to obliterate and distort the history of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them). Al-Mutawakkil al-ʿAbbāsī (232–247 AH / 847–861 CE) flogged al-Jahḍamī (2) one thousand lashes for no reason other than his narration of a hadith from the Messenger of God (ﷺ) explicitly affirming his love for Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them), in which he said:“Whoever loves me and loves these two, and their father, shall be with me at my rank on the Day of Resurrection.” (3)Even this did not avail him until someone interceded on his behalf, claiming that he was among the أهلالسنة (Ahl al-Sunnah). (4)

 

Since al-Balādhurī lived during this period and worked within the framework of the ruling authority, it is certain that this authoritarian methodology influenced his thought and vision, especially as he was among the companions of al-Mutawakkil. This may explain the scarcity of his narrations concerning Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), and what he recorded in Jumal min Ansāb al-Ashrāf does not exceed a few reports related to the attitudes of Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿUthmān toward Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him).

 

In this context, al-Balādhurī mentioned two narrations regarding Abu Bakr. The first is of unknown chain of transmission and introduced with the phrase “it is said”, and reads:“It is said that Abu Bakr once said to him, when he met him on a street in Medina: ‘May my father be sacrificed for you; you resemble the Prophet, not Ali.’” (5)

 

What is noteworthy about this narration is the great caution exercised by al-Balādhurī himself in presenting it, in deference to the ruling authority, as he cited it without a chain of transmission and in a weakened form.

 

The second narration concerns Imam al-Hasan’s stance toward Abu Bakr’s assumption of authority and his usurpation of Imam Ali’s right. It reads:“Abu Bakr delivered a sermon, and al-Hasan came and said to him: ‘Step down from my father’s pulpit!’ Ali then said: ‘This is not something we instructed him to do.’” (6)

 

Although this is the only narration cited by al-Balādhurī concerning Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) during Abu Bakr’s reign, it carries significant implications. From a human perspective, the issuance of such a statement by a child not exceeding nine years of age, in a place crowded with the supporters of the addressed figure, is no trivial matter. It requires great courage and a high level of rhetorical capability. Equally important is that a person of such a young age would find it difficult to grasp the magnitude, complexity, and danger of these political changes unless he possessed exceptional qualities and characteristics not shared by others.Imam al-Hasan’s statement reflects full awareness of the absolute truth established by Qur’anic and Prophetic texts affirming the authority (wilāyah) of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), which was crowned during the Farewell Pilgrimage at Ghadir Khumm when the Messenger of God (ﷺ) said:“Indeed, God is my master and the master of every believer.” Then he took Ali by the hand and said: “Whomever I am his master, this Ali is his master. O God, befriend whoever befriends him and oppose whoever opposes him… Whomever I am his guardian, this Ali is his guardian. O God, befriend whoever befriends him and oppose whoever opposes him.” (7)

 

This right was one that no one could deny, as confirmed by the statement of Ibn al-Ṭufayl, cited by al-Balādhurī, which reads:“I said to Zayd: ‘Did you hear this from the Messenger of God (ﷺ)?’ He said: ‘There was no one among those present beneath the trees except that he saw it with his own eyes and heard it with his own ears.’” (8)

 

On this basis, Abu Bakr’s words indicate that he was fully aware of the legitimacy of Imam Ali’s claim to the caliphate, and that it was deliberately taken from him. This becomes particularly clear when Abu Bakr responded to Imam Ali’s interrogative question about whether they believed they had a right to this matter, replying:“Yes, but I feared discord, and I was entrusted with a grave responsibility.” (9)

 

Abu Bakr’s use of “yes” (balā) in response to Imam Ali’s question carries a linguistic significance in affirming the right of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), thereby negating the denial to which this right was subjected.

 

Accordingly, and in light of what has been stated above, the usurpation of this right occurred at the Saqīfa meeting. Since Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) viewed events with penetrating insight and profound awareness rather than through emotion or tribal partisanship, it is certain that what took place—namely, their preoccupation with power, their abandonment of the Messenger of God (ﷺ), and their failure to participate in his burial—left a deep impact on his soul, which would later be reflected in the nature of his relationship with them. This is especially so given that he participated in that great event and was the last of the Muslims to have direct contact with the Messenger of God (ﷺ), as reported by al-Balādhurī. He narrated, on the authority of Imam ʿAli ibn al-Husayn (peace be upon him), that the last person to have contact with the grave of the Messenger of God (ﷺ) was Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), after his father ordered him to remove the ring of al-Mughīra from the grave. (10)

 

Based on what we have mentioned, we see that Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) joined his parents—Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and al-Zahra (peace be upon her)—in demanding their rightful claim to the caliphate of the Messenger of God (ﷺ). This is confirmed by the statement of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), which reads:“Then I carried Fatima and took my two sons, al-Hasan and al-Husayn, by the hand and said: ‘Call for me anyone from among the people of Badr and those with prior merit among the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār, so that they may witness my right and support me.’ Yet none of the people responded to me—not even four.” (11)Accordingly, Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) played a significant role in these events despite his young age.

When we return once again to review Imam al-Hasan’s address to Abu Bakr and his demand that he step down from his father’s pulpit, we find that this was not a spontaneous act or the impulsive behavior of a nine-year-old who merely witnessed what happened to his father and his supporters. Rather, it reflects complete awareness and full consciousness of his right and its legitimacy. A statement of this magnitude, delivered at such a critical juncture, carries highly significant implications. Addressing such a gathering of Muslims can be regarded as an attempt to restore the Muslim intellect to sound judgment, to shake the Muslim conscience, and to alert them to the grave mistake they had committed.Sayyid Muhammad Bāqir al-Sadr commented on this incident, stating:“One who deeply examines the steps of the conflict, its developments, and the forms it assumed does not understand it as a mere case of claiming a piece of land; rather, a broader concept becomes evident—one that embodies ambition, provokes a revolution, seeks to reclaim a usurped throne, a lost crown, and a great glory, and to reform a nation that had turned back on its heels.” (12)

 

This was precisely what ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb—the primary actor in the events of Saqīfa—perceived when he described Abu Bakr’s caliphate as a sudden occurrence (falta), saying:“The pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr was a sudden event and was concluded as such; indeed, it was so, but God protected from its evil.” (13)

 

Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) was also a witness to the events that accompanied the overthrow of legitimate authority, particularly the incident of the house, the assault upon it, and the threat to burn it. Al-Balādhurī referred to this incident, stating:“Abu Bakr sent for Ali seeking his pledge of allegiance, but he did not pledge. Then ʿUmar came with a burning wick. Fatima met him at the door and said: ‘O son of al-Khaṭṭāb, do you intend to burn my house?’ He replied: ‘Yes, and this is stronger in support of what your father brought.’” (14)

 

Based on these data and the events that took place, it can be said that the nature of the relationship between Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) and the first and second caliphs was not amicable. This is despite attempts by historical sources to depict a contrary image through certain narrations, including the claim that Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) was included in the consultative council (shūrā) convened without granting him any real opinion therein. (15)

 

In our view, this action does not constitute any significant merit for Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) commensurate with his social and religious standing, nor with his well-known intellectual maturity—indeed, his opinion was more refined than those of the participants in the shūrā, except for his father, the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him). Rather, this inclusion amounted merely to lending legitimacy to the act itself. Al-ʿĀmilī explained the exclusion of Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon him) by stating that what he had said to ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb—demanding that he step down from his father’s pulpit—had not faded from ʿUmar’s memory. (16)

 

When tracing the image of Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) and identifying its features during the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, we find that al-Balādhurī did not record any prominent role for him in the events accompanying the third caliph’s reign. Historical sources provide no indication of such a role, despite the fact that Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) was over twenty years of age at that time. The only references found in some historical sources concern his participation, alongside his brother al-Husayn (peace be upon him), in certain military campaigns undertaken by the Muslims, such as the campaign of Ṭabaristān (17) and Ifriqiya. (18)

 

We do not wish here to delve into the authenticity or otherwise of these narrations, which themselves appear intended to legitimize these campaigns—similar to narrations that claim Imam Ali (peace be upon him) participated in fighting some of the apostates. (19) We consider it unlikely that Imam al-Hasan and his brother Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) participated in such campaigns, given their expansionist objectives and pursuit of spoils and gains under the banner of jihad and the spread of Islam—objectives that were certainly not absent from the awareness of Imam Ali (peace be upon him).

 

The second event mentioned by al-Balādhurī concerning ʿUthmān’s period is the participation of Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) in defending the third caliph during the siege of his house by the rebels. This is reported in a narration transmitted by Hishām ibn ʿAmmār, which states:“The people besieged ʿUthmān and prevented water from reaching him. He appeared before them and said: ‘Is there among you Ali?’ They said: ‘No.’ He said: ‘Is there anyone who can convey this to him so that he may provide us with water?’ This reached Ali, so he sent him three water skins filled with water. They barely reached him before several clients of Banū Hāshim and Banū Umayya were wounded because of it. Ali was informed that the people intended to kill ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān. He said: ‘We only intended to confront Marwān; as for killing ʿUthmān, no.’ He then said to al-Hasan and al-Husayn: ‘Go with your swords and stand at the door of ʿUthmān. Do not allow anyone to reach him…’ to prevent the people from entering upon ʿUthmān and to demand the expulsion of Marwān. When Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr saw this, and after the people had shot arrows at ʿUthmān such that Imam al-Hasan was stained with blood at his door, and Marwān was struck by an arrow while inside the house, and Muhammad ibn Ṭalḥa was bloodied, and Qanbar—the client of Ali—was wounded, Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr feared that Banū Hāshim might become enraged over the state of al-Hasan and al-Husayn and stir up a rebellion. He took the two men by the hand and said to them: ‘If Banū Hāshim come and see the blood on the faces of al-Hasan and al-Husayn, they will drive the people away from ʿUthmān and your objective will fail. Come with us so that we may scale the house and kill him without anyone knowing.’ Muhammad and his two companions scaled the wall from the house of an Anṣārī and entered upon ʿUthmān without anyone among those with him knowing, as they were on the rooftops. He was with no one except his wife. Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr said: ‘I will enter first; when I seize him, enter and kill him.’ Muhammad entered and grabbed his beard. ʿUthmān said to him: ‘By God, if your father were to see you, he would be distressed by your position toward me.’ His hand loosened, and the two men entered upon him and killed him. They fled from where they had entered. A woman screamed to the people, but no one heard her scream because of what was happening in the house.” (20)

 

This narration raises numerous questions in the researcher’s mind. First: to what extent can reliance be placed upon this narration and others that claim Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sent his two sons, despite the fact that ʿUthmān ignored his advice? Second: if the narration is authentic, why was the position of Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr contrary to it, given his commitment to obedience to the Commander of the Believers (peace be upon him)? Third: can we rely on what the historical record—including al-Balādhurī—states that Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr was the one who killed ʿUthmān? Fourth: or does reason and reality suggest that another party carried out the assassination to achieve gains for itself afterward?

 

What is mentioned in this narration that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sent Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) to defend ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān against the rebels requires a study of the prevailing general conditions, in addition to an examination of the nature of the private relationships between the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) on the one hand and ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān on the other, as well as the strength and solidity of this relationship that would justify Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sending these two sons rather than his other children. This necessitates a comprehensive study, particularly of the political conditions in Medina, the center of the Rightly Guided Caliphate during that period.

 

Anyone who follows the political and economic events of that era and examines ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān’s policy in administering the Islamic state will find that his approach differed from that of the first and second caliphs. ʿUthmān pursued a policy of favoring Banū Umayya, especially those close to him, appointing them to administrative positions, dismissing the governors appointed by ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb—except Muʿāwiya ibn Abi Sufyān—bringing closer Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam, whom the Messenger of God (ﷺ) had expelled, and appointing him as his adviser in all state affairs. He also appointed his half-brother al-Walīd ibn ʿUqba ibn Abi Muʿayṭ as governor of Kufa (21), his maternal cousin ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir as governor of Basra (22), and his foster brother ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abi Sarḥ as governor of Egypt. He allocated large stipends to them, causing the tribes to feel the bitterness of monarchy. (23)Thus, the Islamic state came to be ruled by Banū Umayya and their followers. Through this, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān laid the foundations for the disappearance of the caliphate in its true sense and its transformation into hereditary kingship—the seeds of the Umayyad state. (24) This occurred despite repeated warnings and advice given by Imam Ali (peace be upon him) to ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, none of which he heeded. It is reported that when ʿUthmān appointed ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abi ʿĀmir ibn Kurayz as governor of Basra, Imam Ali said to him: “Did not ʿUmar advise you not to place the clan of Abi Muʿayṭ and Banū Umayya over the necks of the people?” Yet ʿUthmān gave no response. (25)In addition, ʿUthmān monopolized the contents of the public treasury. Al-Balādhurī states in this context:“There were ornaments in the treasury, and ʿUthmān took from them. When people criticized him for this, he said: ‘This is the wealth of God; I give it to whomever I wish and withhold it from whomever I wish. May God humiliate the nose of whoever is displeased.’” (26)

 

Moreover, he employed authoritarian methods in dealing with his opponents and critics of his policies or of Banū Umayya, such as exiling the Qurʾān reciters of Kufa to Syria. (27) These actions took place before the eyes of Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), particularly what happened to Abu Dharr, whom Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) was among those who bid farewell to, expressing his discontent with the unfolding events. (28)

 

As for the level of private relations, we find that ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān did not restore rights to their rightful owners; on the contrary, he granted Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam the land of Fadak which was the inheritance of Lady Fatima al-Zahra (peace be upon her) making it his private property and that of his descendants. (29)Imam Ali (peace be upon him) openly declared and expressed his view regarding the events of ʿUthmān’s caliphate, clarifying this in his Shaqshaqiyya sermon, in which he described the ordeal of the Ummah caused by the succession of the three caliphs. He said:“Then the third of them rose, swelling his flanks between his dung and fodder, and with him rose the sons of his father, devouring the wealth of God like camels devour the spring pasture…” (30)

 

Thus, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) did not approve of the actions of this government, which imposed itself upon the necks and wealth of the Muslims. He detested it and did not seek closeness to it in any form. Evidence of this is that no historical source indicates that Imam Ali ever accepted stipends from this government—an indication of the depth of his resentment toward a regime that quickly resorted to plundering Muslim wealth and distributing it among its Umayyad relatives and others. (31)

 

A careful examination of the narration cited by al-Balādhurī regarding Imam al-Hasan and his brother al-Husayn (peace be upon them) engaging in the defense of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān against the rebels, alongside a review of the events preceding this incident, reveals numerous inconsistencies and confusions—particularly concerning the roles of the individuals said to have participated in this event, as indicated above.

 

As for the role of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) in the events of the fitna (civil strife), we find that al-Balādhurī presents narrations regarding this role in a confused and contradictory manner. At times, he portrays Imam Ali (peace be upon him) as a defender of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān against the rebels; at other times, he depicts him as the decision-maker and as being among the rebels themselves; at still other times, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) is shown assuming the role of an adviser. In yet other instances, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) is said not to have been present in Medina at all during the days of the fitna.Al-Balādhurī states, within the context of his narration, that when the rebels besieged the house of ʿUthmān and cut off his water supply, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sent him three water skins filled with water. These barely reached him at first, but after fighting with the rebels, the water eventually arrived. (“The people besieged ʿUthmān and prevented water from reaching him…”) From the way al-Balādhurī presents the narrative, he places Imam Ali (peace be upon him) as the leader of the rebels and as the one directing this movement and holding decision-making authority. This leads the researcher to detect a contradiction in what is reported: if Imam Ali (peace be upon him) were indeed the decision-maker, why would the rebels prevent ʿUthmān from drinking the water sent by Imam Ali (peace be upon him)? This is illogical—how could water be sent on the one hand while, on the other, the rebels who are allegedly under his command prevent its delivery? Would it not have been more reasonable for him to order them to allow the water through without resistance? Furthermore, why did Imam Ali (peace be upon him) not lift the siege imposed on ʿUthmān altogether?At the same time, we find that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) was the one calling for calm and was the one who persuaded the rebels to return to their homes after extracting pledges and covenants from ʿUthmān. (32) Moreover, ʿUthmān himself directly accused Imam Ali after the discovery of the letter sent from ʿUthmān to the governor of Egypt, instructing him to imprison, flog, and torture a group of rebels who were returning to Egypt after having revolted against ʿUthmān and demanded reform and fair and equal treatment by his governors. When the letter was brought back to him, ʿUthmān directed a direct accusation at Imam Ali, asking him, “Whom do you accuse?” Imam Ali replied, “I accuse you and I accuse your scribe.” Ali then left angrily, saying, “Rather, it was your order.” (33)In al-Balādhurī’s narrative, there are explicit accusations of incitement to kill ʿUthmān in several places, the most serious of which is the accusation attributed to Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) against his father, Imam Ali (peace be upon him), when he said to him: “Yesterday you killed a man who used to perform ablution thoroughly.” (34) This contradicts the narration claiming that Imam Ali sent al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them) to defend ʿUthmān. This was not the first such accusation; al-Balādhurī also reports that the Umayyads accused Imam Ali (peace be upon him), saying: “The Umayyads said: ‘O Ali, you have corrupted our affair and incited and stirred up the people.’” (35)

 

Such accusations against the Imam were not coincidental. Rather, the Umayyads and others who harbored animosity toward the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) sought thereby to legitimize waging war against Imam Ali (peace be upon him) at al-Jamal and Ṣiffīn, on the pretext that he was the instigator and decision-maker, and that they were justified in seeking revenge against him. They claimed that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) had incited the killing of ʿUthmān in order to attain the caliphate. This is what ʿUthmān himself expressed when he accused Imam Ali, despite the fact that ʿUthmān was simultaneously seeking Imam Ali’s assistance, as reflected in his statement: “O God, Ali loves authority; so do not bless him in it.” (36)

 

In contrast, we find Imam Ali (peace be upon him) repeatedly responding to these accusations and defending himself, saying: “Alas! You know that I had nothing to do withit.” (37) He also said: “O God, I am innocent of what they claim and of his blood, should anything happen.” (38) He further stated, in rejecting the accusation: “I neither loved his killing nor hated it; I neither ordered it nor forbade it.” (39) And he said: “O God, I dissociate myself before You from the blood of ʿUthmān.” (40)

 

This demonstrates that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) did not intervene, directly or indirectly, except by calling for an end to the fitna and allowing the people themselves to decide the matter. He did not call for ʿUthmān’s killing and did not assist in it, as he said: “O God, I dissociate myself before You from his blood, whether I was among those who killed him or those who aided his killers.” (41)

 

Imam Ali’s role in managing the fitna was thus limited to counsel alone. He repeatedly urged ʿUthmān to restore people’s rights and criticized his misuse of authority, which had led to the outbreak of the fitna, and he attempted to reform matters on more than one occasion. As Imam Ali himself stated: “I turned the people of Egypt away from ʿUthmān, then I reformed his affair time after time—what more could I do?” (42)

Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sought to avert civil strife and avoid fighting, even though he was convinced that ʿUthmān’s administration of the state was flawed and that the Umayyads had seized control of governance to pursue their own interests. They even came to believe that the Islamic state had become the property of Banū Umayya. Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam, in particular, was convinced that authority belonged to them and inflamed the rebels, saying to them: “You have come seeking to wrest our kingdom from our hands. Leave us alone! By God, if you confront us, we will impose upon you from us a matter that will neither please you nor earn your praise. Return to your homes, for by God we are not defeated.” (43)

 

Thus, it was Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam who inflamed the rebels and prevented matters from proceeding as Imam Ali (peace be upon him) had arranged—namely, taking pledges from ʿUthmān to resolve matters properly and to close the door to fitna. Imam Ali said to ʿUthmān: “I have spoken to you time after time; each time we leave and say matters are settled, then you go back on it. This is the doing of Marwān, Ibn ʿĀmir, Muʿāwiya, and ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿd. You obey them and disobey me.” (44)

 

From here emerges the role of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), who strove earnestly to end the fitna. This reflects the principle that leadership or caliphate exists to unite Islam. Even though ʿUthmān proved incapable of bearing this burden, he was not held accountable under the law. Rather, he became a compliant façade for a dubious Umayyad clique that used him as a mount while he accepted humiliation. Thus, he found it difficult to satisfy the Ummah with justice at the expense of usurping his relatives’ claims based on falsehood. (45)

 

Imam Ali (peace be upon him) summarized the situation, saying: “One of you monopolized authority and acted wrongly, and you panicked and acted wrongly in panic; yet God will judge both the monopolizer and the panicker.” (46) He identified the core problem to ʿUthmān as Umayyad domination during that period, telling him: “These people have mounted you, overpowered you, and seized control of affairs without you.” (47)

 

Al-Balādhurī reports that:when ʿUthmān was killed, Ḥudhayfa ibn al-Yamān said: “ʿUthmān monopolized authority and did wrong in doing so; we panicked and did wrong in panicking. They saw things from him that they disapproved of, and they will see even worse things that they will not disapprove of.” (48)

 

Al-Ṭabarī also reports, in this context, that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) assumed the role of adviser and defender, while being fully aware of where matters would ultimately lead and identifying their causes. He said: “I continued to defend him until I became ashamed. But Marwān, Muʿāwiya, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿĀmir, and Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ did to him what you see. When I advised him and ordered him to dismiss them, he treated me with suspicion until what you see came to pass.” (49)

 

Thus, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) removed from himself the accusation regarding ʿUthmān’s killing, despite his conviction that this outcome was inevitable. He portrayed the event and what would follow it. Shuʿba narrated from Abū Ḥamza al-Ḍabʿī, who said: “I said to Ibn ʿAbbās: My father informed me that he heard Ali say: ‘Whoever asks me about the blood of ʿUthmān—God killed him, and I am with God.’ He said: ‘Your father spoke the truth. Do you know what he meant by ‘God killed him, and I am with God’? He meant that God decreed his killing, and I stand with God.’” (50)(51)

 

From here emerges the Imam’s perception of the events and their consequences. If we carefully reflect on the phrase “God killed him, and I am with God,” we find within it a profound foresight regarding what would soon occur. While we cannot fully grasp the speech of the infallible Imam (peace be upon him) or access the entirety of his insight, we can read the unfolding events, namely, Umayyad intervention and their domination over the course of affairs.This raises within us questions about what the Imam may have foreseen for the future. For example: what would have happened had ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān transferred the caliphate to a member of the Umayyad household, such as Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam or Muʿāwiya? What would the condition of the Islamic state have been, and what consequences would such a bequest have entailed?Here we recognize the penetrating vision of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), a vision perhaps broader and deeper than what is apparent on the surface.Al-Balādhurī’s placing Imam Ali (peace be upon him) under suspicion as the one directing the rebels is incorrect. Al-Balādhurī himself negates this claim through the very narrations he presents. He reports Imam Ali as saying in a sermon in which he mentioned ʿUthmān: “By God, besides whom there is no god, I did not kill him, I did not assist his killers, nor did I approve of it.” (52)

 

Al-Balādhurī also reports another narration absolving Imam Ali (peace be upon him) of suspicion in ʿUthmān’s killing: “By God, ʿUthmān was killed while Ali was in his own house, unaware of it and of who killed him.” (53)

 

He further adds another narration stating that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) was far removed from these events and was outside Medina at the time, saying: “ʿUthmān was killed while Ali was in a place called al-Bughaygha, four Farsakhs above Medina.” (54)

 

This negates the accusations that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) lay in wait for or orchestrated the killing of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān. Based on these data, it is untenable that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) would send Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) to defend ʿUthmān, particularly since Imam Ali did not acknowledge the legitimacy of ʿUthmān’s caliphate.Moreover, when we examine the sequence of events in the narrations, we find them confused and contradictory, making them unreliable—especially those claiming Imam al-Hasan’s participation in defending ʿUthmān. Such reports appear to be among the fabrications attached to Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him), portraying him in the eyes of many historians as having Umayyad sympathies and as remaining in mourning for ʿUthmān. (55)Yet al-Balādhurī’s own narration—that Imam Ali sent Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) to defend ʿUthmān—does not accord with the actual circumstances of ʿUthmān’s caliphate. Moreover, there are numerous indicators that compel us to reject this alleged participation, as follows:

 

First. The participation of only Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) among Imam Ali’s sons is illogical amid the conditions prevailing in Medina during the fitna. (56) Why would Imam Ali send only these two and not, for example, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya? Why did Imam Ali not deploy him on this occasion, given that he routinely placed him in front of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in the fiercest battles?Indeed, Imam Ali was especially protective of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in all wars. It is reported that Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya was asked: “Why did your father expose you to dangers that he did not expose al-Hasan and al-Husayn to?” He replied: “Because they were his cheeks, and I was his hand; he would protect his cheeks with his hand.” (57)(58)

 

Thus, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) safeguarded al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them) intensely because, as he said, they were the sons of the Messenger of God (ﷺ). For this reason, he protected them and was extremely cautious regarding their safety. In the Battle of Ṣiffīn, for example, he sent Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya into combat instead of the two Imams. He said to him: “My son, you are my son, but these are the sons of the Messenger of God (ﷺ). Should I not protect them from fighting?” Muḥammad replied: “Yes, my father. May God make me their ransom against every harm.” (59)

 

Thus, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya supported al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them). Yet under these very circumstances, al-Balādhurī presents another narration claiming that ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān sent to Imam Ali asking him to come, and that Ali sent al-Husayn (peace be upon him) instead. When al-Husayn arrived, ʿUthmān said to him: “O son of my brother, are you able to protect me from the people?” He replied, “No.” ʿUthmān then said, “Then you are released from my pledge.” Al-Husayn returned to Ali and informed him of what ʿUthmān had said. Ali rose to go to him, but Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya stood up and grabbed his arm to prevent him. Ibn Abzī said: “I saw Ali glare at him and say: ‘May your mother lose you!’” Then the cry came that ʿUthmān had been killed. Ali stretched his hand toward the qibla and said: “O God, I dissociate myself before You from the blood of ʿUthmān.” (60)

 

Here, al-Balādhurī overlooks one matter and contradicts himself in another. First, it is inconceivable that Imam Ali (peace be upon him) would know that Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon him) was in danger confronting the rebels and yet leave him in such circumstances without rising to support his brother al-Hasan (peace be upon him). Second, it is impossible that Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya could prevent Imam Ali from going if he had truly intended to do so. Imam Ali was an Imam whose obedience was obligatory, and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya could not oppose him—especially given Imam Ali’s physical strength, which no one could restrain.

 

Moreover, al-Balādhurī states that Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon him) returned to his father, and at that moment news arrived of ʿUthmān’s killing. This indicates that Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) was not present at the time of ʿUthmān’s death. Thus, this narration refutes the earlier claim that Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon him) participated in defending ʿUthmān, as it places him in his father’s house at that moment. This also undermines the report claiming that Imam Ali returned to find ʿUthmān killed and struck al-Hasan and struck his brother al-Husayn (peace be upon them), as stated in the narration: “Ali said to his sons: ‘How was the Commander of the Faithful killed while you were at the door?’ Then he raised his hand and slapped al-Hasan, struck al-Husayn on the chest, insulted Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥa, and cursed ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr.” (61)

 

Furthermore, Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) told ʿUthmān that he could not restrain the people from him—so why would he fight when he already knew he could not protect him? This raises another question: why would Imam Ali strike his sons al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them), bloodied while defending ʿUthmān? Moreover, al-Balādhurī attributes the title Amīr al-Muʾminīn (Commander of the Faithful) to ʿUthmān on the tongue of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), which is unacceptable, as this title was exclusive to Imam Ali and was not applied to anyone before or after him. (62)

 

Other sources transmit a similar narration with slight but significant differences, contradicting al-Balādhurī’s version:“When the Egyptians realized they were besieged, they said: ‘Nothing will save us except killing this man.’ They rushed the door, but al-Hasan, al-Husayn, al-Zubayr, Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥa, Marwān, and Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ prevented them. They remained stationed at the door. ʿUthmān called out to them: ‘By God, you are released from defending me.’ They refused. He opened the door, went out with a shield and sword, confronted the Egyptians, and they retreated. He swore by God that the Companions must enter; when they refused to withdraw, they entered and closed the door behind them against the Egyptians.” (63)

 

According to al-Balādhurī, Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon him) was with his father in the house, and other sources state that Imam al-Husayn did not participate in defending ʿUthmān. This leads us to ask: why were Imam al-Hasan and Imam al-Husayn (peace be upon them) struck if Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya was able to prevent Imam Ali from assisting ʿUthmān and from leaving his house? Such behavior is inconceivable within the upbringing of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) and the obedience of their children to them.When we scrutinize the narration and verify the flow of events, we find numerous contradictions. Among the clearest is al-Balādhurī’s statement that when ʿUthmān requested water, Imam Ali (peace be upon him) sent water skins filled with water, which failed to reach ʿUthmān because the rebels prevented their entry. Al-Balādhurī says amid these events: “Several clients of Banū Hāshim were wounded because of it, until the water reached him.” (64)

 

This indicates that fighting erupted between those who wanted to reach ʿUthmān with water and those who opposed him, resulting in injuries among the clients of Banū Hāshim. Banū Umayya were aware that fighting was taking place and that the city atmosphere was tense. A number of these clients were wounded—yet al-Balādhurī then presents the narration in a contradictory direction, stating that Imam Ali said to al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them): “Go with your swords and stand at the door of ʿUthmān and do not allow anyone to reach him…” He then says: “When Muḥammad ibn Abi Bakr saw this, and after the people had shot arrows at ʿUthmān such that al-Hasan was stained with blood at his door, and Marwān was struck by an arrow inside the house, and Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥa was bloodied, and Qanbar—the client of Ali—was wounded, Muḥammad ibn Abi Bakr feared that Banū Hāshim would become enraged over the state of al-Hasan and al-Husayn and stir up fitna against ʿUthmān, thereby thwarting what you intend.” (65)Here the contradiction is clear: how could Banū Hāshim be unaware of the injuries inflicted upon al-Hasan and al-Husayn (peace be upon them) and suddenly rise to defend ʿUthmān and avenge them, when members of Banū Hāshim and Banū Umayya had already been wounded while attempting to deliver water to ʿUthmān? They were well aware of what was happening in Medina, particularly during the siege, as news of the fitna and the arrival of the Egyptians, Kufans, and Basrans in Medina had become widespread. These developments were not confined to Banū Hāshim and Banū Umayya alone.Moreover, the siege of ʿUthmān lasted a considerable period and was not brief—commonly reported as forty days, with other reports stating slightly more, while al-Shaʿbī said it lasted twenty-two nights. (66)

 

Al-Balādhurī’s narrative compels us to pause and reconsider the role of Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr in this civil strife, the nature of his involvement in its events, and the reason for emphasizing his participation in the killing of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān. Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr took two men by the hand and said to them: “If Banū Hāshim arrive and see the blood on al-Ḥasan’s face, they will drive the people away from ʿUthmān and your objective will fail. Therefore, come with us; let us climb over the wall of the house and kill him without anyone knowing.” Thus, Muḥammad and his two companions climbed over the wall from the house of a man from the Anṣār until they entered upon ʿUthmān, and none of those who were with him knew, for they were on the rooftops, and his wife was not with him. Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr then said: “I will enter first. If I seize him, then come in and finish him off.” Muḥammad entered, seized him by the beard, whereupon ʿUthmān said: “Had your father seen you, he would have been displeased with your position toward me.” At this, Muḥammad’s hand slackened. The two men then fell upon him and killed him, and they fled from where they had entered. (67)Here we find that matters do not proceed in a natural or coherent manner. The events of the fitna, as narrated by al-Balādhurī, move in two opposing directions. The first is the rebels who were demanding the blood of ʿUthmān; here al-Balādhurī claims that Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr was their instigator, leader, and a participant in killing ʿUthmān. The second group consists of those defending ʿUthmān—namely al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (peace be upon them), Banū Hāshim, Banū Umayya, and certain Companions and their sons.

 

This presents a clear contradiction, for Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr could not logically be in a camp opposed to al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (peace be upon them). Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr was the stepson of Imām ʿAlī (peace be upon him), raised under his care and authority. How, then, could he fight on a side that Imām ʿAlī did not approve of—especially when the opposing side included two of ʿAlī’s own sons? Such a narrative is unacceptable both in form and in substance, for Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr could not have fought those who were effectively his brothers, raised alongside him.Imām ʿAlī (peace be upon him) said of Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr: “He is my son, though born of Abū Bakr.” (68) He was raised in the household of Imām ʿAlī alongside al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, as the Imām himself stated: “He was dear to me and raised under my care.” (69) After his martyrdom, Imām ʿAlī said of him: “With God we reckon him—a righteous son, a tireless worker, a sharp sword, and a steadfast pillar.” (70)

 

As for his relationship with the sons of Imām ʿAlī, he was to them an obedient brother, as the Imām said: “He was raised by me, was a brother to my sons, and I was to him a father, counting him as a son.” (71) From this, it is evident that Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr was obedient to Imām ʿAlī and could not have been hostile toward the Imām’s sons.Thus, the attribution of this accusation appears to be among the fabrications of the Umayyad state, intended to legitimize the war against Imām ʿAlī (peace be upon him) at al-Jamal, by portraying him as the instigator of ʿUthmān’s murder. As for the gruesome details cited in the narrative—particularly the claim that Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr seized ʿUthmān by the beard and then released him upon hearing mention of his father—this is implausible. Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr was raised in the household of Imām ʿAlī and had no meaningful relationship with his biological father; thus, he would not have been emotionally affected in this manner.Indeed, some sources state that Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr publicly dissociated himself from his father when pledging allegiance to Imām ʿAlī. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon him) is reported to have said: “Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr pledged allegiance to ʿAlī upon disavowing his father.” (72) It is also reported that Muḥammad said to Imām ʿAlī: “I testify that you are the divinely obligated Imām, and that my father is in Hell.” (73) This demonstrates that Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr was not influenced by his father to the extent claimed in the narrative.

 

Al-Balādhurī also reports that Companions, Banū Hāshim, Banū Umayya, Ibn al-Zubayr, and Ibn Ṭalḥa participated in defending ʿUthmān, stating that al-Zubayr sent his son ʿAbd Allāh, Ṭalḥa sent his son reluctantly, and several Companions sent their sons to prevent people from reaching ʿUthmān (74). He further claims that there were seven hundred defenders inside the house (75), in addition to al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn (peace be upon them), Qanbar, and Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam.

 

Such figures are clearly exaggerated and lack historical basis. If there were indeed seven hundred defenders over a siege lasting forty days or more, it would have been sufficient to resolve the crisis. Yet historical sources do not record any actual combat or fatalities between the two sides, which is illogical given the prolonged siege and the alleged numbers involved.Furthermore, the narrator of the report, Yaḥyā ibn Ayyūb, is among those whose narrations are unreliable. Evidence suggests that the people of Medina—whether supporters of ʿUthmān or otherwise—did not seriously defend him and left him to face his fate alone. Even Ṭalḥa is reported to have sent his son unwillingly (76), and some sources indicate that figures from within Medina actively incited the Kūfans and Baṣrans to join the Egyptians in killing ʿUthmān (77).Imām ʿAlī (peace be upon him) was fully aware of this reality and stated explicitly: “O people of Kūfa and Baṣra, by God, this matter was orchestrated in Medina.” (78)

 

As for the participation of the sons of the Companions in fighting alongside Imam al-Ḥasan and his brother al-Ḥusayn (peace be upon them) in defense of ʿUthmān, this places the reader in a state of confusion. This is because those whom al-Balādhurī mentions as having participated in the defense of ʿUthmān are the very individuals who later called for fighting ʿAlī (peace be upon him) in the Battle of al-Jamal. They are also the ones who accused him of responsibility for the killing of ʿUthmān. At the same time, al-Balādhurī reports that a number of these same individuals were among those who took part in, and incited, the killing of ʿUthmān. Al-Balādhurī states that Said ibn al- 'Aaṣ advised ʿUthmān to enter into a state of consecration (iḥrām), proclaim the pilgrimage formula (talbiyah), and set out for Mecca. When this reached the group besieging ʿUthmān, they said: “By God, if he goes out, we will surely disperse him until God judges between us and him. The pressure of Ṭalḥah ibn ʿUbayd Allāh during the siege intensified, and he prevented water from reaching ʿUthmān. (79)

 

This aligns with Ibn Qutayba’s account, in which Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ confronted ʿĀʾisha as she set out to Baṣra demanding vengeance for ʿUthmān, telling her: “These are ʿUthmān’s killers with you,” referring to Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr (80).Moreover, ʿĀʾisha herself was implicated in inciting against ʿUthmān, repeatedly calling for his death, saying: “Kill Naʿthal, for he has committed disbelief.” (81)Additionally, the one person who possessed the military strength to defend ʿUthmān—Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān—failed to do so, despite ʿUthmān’s appeals. This led ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ to say to Muʿāwiya: “You abandoned him while the people of Al-Sham were with you.” (82)

 

All of this demonstrates that the killing of ʿUthmān was not solely the work of Egyptians, Kūfans, and Baṣrans, but was orchestrated by powerful figures from within Medina and beyond. This is precisely what Imām ʿAlī (peace be upon him) alluded to when he said regarding the Companions of al-Jamal: "What are they saying? He was answered: They curse the killers of ʿUthmān (83), Then Imam Ali said: Yes, may God curse the killers of Uthmān —yet by God, none killed him but they themselves." (84)This is further confirmed by Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam’s statement upon killing Ṭalḥa at the Battle of al-Jamal: “I have avenged for you one of your father’s killers.” (85)

The conclusion of this study demonstrates that the nature of the relationship between Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) and those who assumed political authority after the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) was a complex relationship, founded upon a clear distinction between moral legitimacy derived from the Household of Prophethood and political authority imposed by historical circumstances following the Saqīfa coup and the consequences that ensued from it. This event deprived the Islamic state of the legitimacy of the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) in assuming their rightful position and fulfilling their major role in governing the state according to divine law.Despite this, Imam al-Hasan (peace be upon him) maintained an active social presence and a highly influential guiding role, relying on his religious and symbolic status, his appropriate position—even at a young age—and the elevated rank that God Almighty ordained for them, as affirmed by the saying of the Noble Messenger (ﷺ): “Al-Hasan and al-Husayn are Imams whether they rise or remain seated.” They are the legitimate heirs of the House of Prophethood and the source of the divine message. This was evident in his oppositional stance toward the authority of the first three caliphs and his clear articulation of his position against them, while at the same time avoiding confrontation that might threaten the unity of the Islamic community.

 

Thus, the Imam’s positions did not reflect a withdrawal from the social or political sphere; rather, they embodied a conscious vision that recalibrated the relationship between values and power, offering a model for managing political disagreement within the framework of religious and historical responsibility. Accordingly, this relationship reveals a marked tension between principle and reality and contributes to enriching our early understanding of the nature of governance and leadership in Islamic history.

1.      Sulaym b. Qays al-Hilālī, Kitāb Sulaym b. Qays, p. 314; Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, 2/174; Anonymous author, Akhbār al-Dawla al-ʿAbbāsiyya, p. 47; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 11/44; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 33/116.

2.      Abū ʿAmr Naṣr b. ʿAlī b. Ṣabḥān al-Azdī al-Jahḍamī al-Baṣrī, the reliable ḥāfiẓ scholar. It is reported that al-Mustaʿīn sought to appoint him as a judge. He requested permission to return, prayed two units, and said: “O God, if there is any good for me with You, then take me to You.” He then slept and was found dead. He died in 250 AH (or 251 AH). See: al-Yāfiʿī al-Makkī, Mirʾāt al-Janān, 2/116; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-Wafayāt, 27/48; al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, 12/133.

3.      Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Musnad Aḥmad, 1/177.

4.      al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Madīnat Baghdād, 13/289; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, 10/384; for more on al-Mutawakkil’s policy toward the ʿAlawīs, see: al-ʿĪsāwī, ʿAlāʾ Kāmil Ṣāliḥ, The Policy of the Abbasid Caliphs toward the ʿAlawīs, pp. 126–137.

5.      Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1/539.

6.      Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 3/26.

7.      Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/110; al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa Tamām al-Niʿma, p. 234; al-Ṭūsī, al-Amālī, p. 227; Sulaymān al-Kūfī, Manāqib al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 2/435; al-Ḥākim al-Nīsābūrī, al-Mustadrak, 3/109.

8.      Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/110.

9.      Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1/582.

10.   al-Jamal, 1/578.

11.   Sulaym b. Qays al-Hilālī, Kitāb Sulaym b. Qays, p. 216.

12.   Fadak in History, p. 63.

13.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1/581–592; see also al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 2/26; Ibn Ṭāwūs, Madhāhib al-Ṭawāʾif, p. 237; al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-Qārī, 7/24; al-Suyūṭī, Tārīkh al-Khulafāʾ, p. 75; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 30/233.

14.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1/585; see Ibn Qutayba, al-Imāma wa al-Siyāsa, 1/30.

15.   Ibn Qutayba, al-Imāma wa al-Siyāsa, 1/28.

16.   al-Ṣaḥīḥ fī al-Imām ʿAlī, 15/120.

17.   A vast mountainous region in Iran, south of the Caspian Sea and north of the Alborz Mountains.

18.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/323.

19.   Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, 2/128.

20.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/558–559.

21.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/558–559.

22.   Al-Walīd b. ʿUqba b. Abī Muʿayṭ… (full historical account as cited). See: Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-Ghāba, 4/675–677; al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, 2/553.

23.   See Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā, 3/64; 5/36.

24.   See al-Mawdūdī, al-Khilāfa wa al-Mulk, 7/73.

25.   Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/517.

26.   Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/517.

27.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/528, 534; Ibn Shabba, Tārīkh al-Madīna, 3/1141; Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt, 7/104; al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 4/16.

28.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/545; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, 2/172.

29.   al-Jawharī, al-Saqīfa wa Fadak, p. 78; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj, 8/252; al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 22/412.

30.   al-Ṣadūq, ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, 1/151; al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, 1/289; Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib, 2/92; al-Ṭabarsī, al-Amālī, p. 373; Ibn Ṭāwūs, Maʿrifat al-Ṭawāʾif, p. 418; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj, 1/197.

31.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/514; al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/313, 3/365.

32.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/555.

33.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/556; Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, al-Futūḥ, 2/413; see also Abū al-Qāsim al-Kūfī, al-Istighātha, 1/62; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 3/22.

34.   Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 3/22.

35.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/182.

36.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/551.

37.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/182.

38.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/92.

39.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/595.

40.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/587; Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā, 3/68; Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Muṣannaf fī al-Aḥādīth wa al-Āthār, 5/68; Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 4/352; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 12/295.

41.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/397; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, 3/195; al-Mufīd, al-Jamal aw al-Nuṣra fī Ḥarb al-Baṣra, p. 103; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab, 9/483; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya, 7/193.

42.   al-Manqarī, Waqʿat Ṣiffīn, p. 91; Ibn Aʿtham, al-Futūḥ, p. 559; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 15/78; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 33/77.

43.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/578; Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrā, 3/68; Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Muṣannaf, 5/68; Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 4/352; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 12/295.

44.   Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, 3/162.

45.   al-Manqarī, Waqʿat Ṣiffīn, p. 92.

46.   Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 2/126; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 30/499.

47.   Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, same source, 9/24.

48.   Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/539.

49.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/310.

50.   Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Muṣannaf, 8/365; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 31/165.

51.   al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, al-Imāma, 4/308; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 3/66; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 31/165.

52.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/592; see Ibn Abī Shabba, al-Muṣannaf, 8/685; Ibn Shabba, Tārīkh al-Madīna, 4/1263; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 3/66.

53.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/587.

54.   Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, al-Fitna al-Kubrā, p. 43.

55.   Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, al-Fitna al-Kubrā, p. 43.

56.   Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Dimashq, 54/334; al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-Kamāl, 29/2.

57.   As reported in some sources as “ʿAyniyya” instead of “from his cheeks” in one narration. See: Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān, 4/172; al-Yamanī al-Makkī, Mirʾāt al-Janān wa ʿIbrat al-Yaqẓān, 1/123; Ibn ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī, Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār Man Dhahab, p. 989.

58.   Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Dimashq, 54/343; al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-Kamāl, 29/52; al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, 4/117; al-Dhahabī, Tārīkh al-Islām, 100/84. See also the variant narration cited above.

59.   al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, Rasāʾil al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, 3/264; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-ʿUqūl, p. 296; al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Sarāʾir, p. 338; al-Zamakhsharī, Rabīʿ al-Abrār, 2/446; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 45/349; Ibn Ḥamdūn, al-Tadhkira al-Ḥamdūniyya, 3/96.

60.   Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/587.

61.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/559.

62.   al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 8/288; al-Kūfī, al-Manāqib, 1/391; al-Ṣadūq, al-Amālī, p. 450; Ibn Ṭāwūs, al-Yaqīn bi-Ikhtiṣāṣ Mawlānā ʿAlī bi-Imrat al-Muʾminīn, p. 135; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 42/386; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj al-Balāgha, 9/169.

63.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/174; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam, 5/54; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, 3/174; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab, 19/344; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 39/435.

64.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/558.

65.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/558.

66.   Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya, 7/212.

67.   Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 1/559.

68.   Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj al-Balāgha, 53/6; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 2/96.

69.   Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 6/53; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 33/580.

70.   al-Kūfī, al-Ghārāt, p. 764; al-Rāwandī, Minhāj al-Barāʿa fī Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 3/119; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, 16/145; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 33/594.

71.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/404; al-Kūfī, al-Ghārāt, 1/301; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-Balāgha, 6/94; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-Dhahab, 2/409.

72.   al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Rijāl al-Kashshī, 1/282; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Ikhtiṣāṣ, p. 70; al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, 33/585.

73.   al-Ṭabarsī, Ikhtiyār Maʿrifat al-Rijāl, 1/82; al-Mufīd, same source, p. 70; al-Majlisī, same source, 33/585.

74.   Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/2/185.

75.   Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/564.

76.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/558.

77.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/387; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 39/319.

78.   al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulūk, 3/387; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 39/319.

79.   Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 5/561.

80.   Ibn Qutayba, al-Imāma wa al-Siyāsa, 1/59–60.

81.   Ibn Qutayba, al-Imāma wa al-Siyāsa, 1/59–60.

82.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 3/74; al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh al-Yaʿqūbī, 2/186; Ibn Qutayba, al-Imāma wa al-Siyāsa, 1/88.

83.   al-Balādhurī, Extracts from Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/241.

84.   Ibn al-Aʿtham al-Kūfī, al-Futūḥ, 2/421; al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī, 3/377; al-Ḥillī, Taqrīb al-Maʿrif, p. 296; Ibn Miskawayh, Tajārib al-Umam, 1/469; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, 3/306; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, Nahj al-Balāgha, 17/20.

85.   al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-Ashrāf, 2/246; Ibn Shabba, Tārīkh al-Madīna, 4/6171; Ibn Shahr Āshūb, Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib, 2/646; al-Ḥākim al-Nīsābūrī, al-Mustadrak, 3/371.