A DISTINCTIVE APPROACH TO HADITH CRITICISM IN THE IMĀMĪ SCHOOL: REJECTING HADITH CONTRARY TO IJMĀʿ (CONSENSUS)

The term ijmāʿ (consensus) lexically denotes “intending” and “agreeing,” whereas in the technical usage of Islamic legal theory it refers to the unanimous agreement of the mujtahids of the Muslim community in a given generation on a particular religious ruling—that is, the reaching of a definitive legal judgement by those qualified to issue authoritative fatwas (al-Jurjānī, 1306, 4). Shīʿī sources define ijmāʿ in nearly identical terms. Among Shīʿī scholars, al-Anṣārī notes that the concept bears two meanings: the first is “resolving/deciding,” as attested in the Qurʾānic verse, fa-ajmiʿū amrakum (Yūnus 10:71). The second denotes “agreeing unanimously,” as in the expression ajmaʿa al-muslimūn ʿalā kadha, which signifies the Muslims’ consensus on a given matter (al-Anṣārī, 1415, 1:500; al-Ghurayfī, 2014, 11). Technically, therefore, ijmāʿ signifies a unanimous scholarly agreement on a particular issue, that is, the convergence of qualified Muslim scholars upon a religious judgement.

 

Within the Shīʿī—specifically Imāmī—tradition, however, ijmāʿ assumes a more specialized meaning. According to Imāmī doctrine, ijmāʿ refers not to the consensus of all Muslim scholars but exclusively to the agreement of Shīʿī scholars within a given generation on a religious matter (al-Ghurayfī, 2014, 11). Beyond this, Shīʿī scholarship identifies a group of eighteen transmitters among the students of Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114/733 [?]) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) who are collectively known as the Aṣḥāb al-Ijmāʿ (“the People of Consensus”). These eighteen authorities transmitted 110 legal opinions, and any report or ḥadīth that contradicts these 110 rulings is categorically rejected within Imāmī methodology. This is because, according to Shīʿī scholars, the consensus formed in these cases represents the very ruling of the Maʿṣūm (Infallible) Imams. When the view of the Maʿṣūm Imam on any matter is known, the disagreement of the broader Muslim community is considered irrelevant, for in such contexts the Maʿṣūm Imam occupies an authoritative status analogous to that of the Prophet himself (al-Mufīd, 1993, 121). His ruling constitutes a definitive legal judgement in religion; accordingly, issuing a fatwa that contradicts it is impermissible, and any report or ḥadīth that diverges from it cannot be accepted.

 

In this article, the focus will be limited to the Imāmī conception of ijmāʿ, specifically the rejection of ḥadīth reports that contradict consensus and the various internal tensions associated with ijmāʿ as understood in Shīʿī sources. No comparative methodology will be employed between the Sunnī and Shīʿī/Imāmī traditions. The Sunnī understanding of ijmāʿ and the question of rejecting ḥadīth on the basis of contradicting consensus will be addressed in a separate study. It should merely be noted here that Imām al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), in his al-Risālah, does not refer at all to Shīʿī views when discussing the doctrine of consensus (al-Shāfiʿī, 1938, 471–476). Likewise, scholars who authored independent treatises on the subject—such as Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930 [?]) and Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1071)—do not treat or compare the Shīʿī understanding of ijmāʿ in their works.

 

Shīʿī scholars, however, felt compelled to articulate positions that diverged from Sunnī doctrine in order to reinforce their own legitimacy, for they never constituted more than roughly one quarter of the Muslim population. Consequently, they regarded alignment with the majority view—namely, the Sunnī position on ijmāʿ—as a threat to their doctrinal authority. For this reason, they did not accept those who denied the authority of the Maʿṣūm Imam as complete believers, even if they were Muslims (Shaykh Ṣadūq, 1987, 231).

 

This stance was reinforced by the perception that Sunnī scholars considered reliable the ḥadīth transmissions of Companions who, at times, had disobeyed the Prophet’s directives, and that they could establish consensus even on matters for which no explicit Qurʾānic verse or prophetic report existed. Moreover, Shīʿī scholars believed that the Maʿṣūm Imam—whom they regarded as the exclusive repository of religious truth—could not hold the same views on legal and theological issues as Sunnī scholars who did not accept his authority (al-Murtaẓā, 1405, 1/15; al-Khuḍarī Bek, 1969, 279).

This theory compelled Shīʿī scholars to confront several uncertainties. After the year 329 AH, when the Major Occultation began, the Imam in whom they believed withdrew from public sight and declared that he would not meet with anyone until God willed otherwise. Yet, according to their doctrinal claims, the perpetual existence of a Maʿṣūm (Infallible) Imam until the Day of Resurrection was deemed a necessary requirement (al-Qummī, 1987, 157). The concealment of the Maʿṣūm and his apparent disengagement from the concerns of his followers seemed incompatible with divine wisdom. Because of the confusion generated by these issues, the Shīʿī community—having previously lost a portion of its adherents—developed theological and rational arguments to establish the continued existence of the Hidden Imam.

 

In the fourth Islamic century, the prominent Shīʿī theologian Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) and his disciples, such as al-Sharīf al-Murtaẓā (d. 436/1044) and al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), formulated the doctrine of ijmāʿ. According to this conceptualization, even if the Imam was not directly identifiable, he nonetheless existed as a real person among his partisans and continued to issue legal opinions as an unidentified (majhūl al-ḥāl) mujtahid scholar in matters of dispute. Thus, although the scholars could not determine his exact identity, their consensus was understood to be one that included the Maʿṣūm Imam.

 

Although this theory was not acceptable to their opponents, al-Mufīd’s student al-Sharīf al-Murtaẓā deemed the Imam’s participation in ijmāʿ a necessity, whereas his own student Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī considered it a divine favor. According to the understanding of ijmāʿ that crystallized in the subsequent period, the Maʿṣūm Imam was believed to be definitively present within one of the two opposing views even in situations of internal contradiction. For this reason, identifying the valid ijmāʿ essentially meant locating the consensus in which the Imam participated. In cases of disagreement where the transmitted sources—namely the Qur’ān and reports from the Maʿṣūm Imams—provided no decisive evidence, preference was to be given to the view that included a scholar whose identity was unknown. This was because the unidentified (majhūl al-nasab) scholar was, with high probability, the Maʿṣūm Imam himself, issuing legal opinions for his adherents without disclosing his identity.

 

1. The Formation Process of Ijmāʿ and Its Evidentiary Status

Shīʿī scholars, even though they do not recognize his caliphate, acknowledge that the first ijmāʿ occurred among the Companions concerning the caliphate of Abū Bakr. From their perspective, although there was no explicit religious proof regarding this matter, the scholars sought evidence from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. The initial consensus took place primarily among the residents of Madinah or among the Prophet’s prominent Companions. According to the Companions, this ijmāʿ and agreement on the caliphate were considered sufficient for establishing the ruling. That is, even in the absence of direct evidence in the Qurʾān or the Sunnah, the consensus and agreement of scholars on subsidiary matters—according to Sunnī schools of thought rather than Shīʿī interpretation—constitutes a valid religious proof.

 

Although the Shīʿa accepted ijmāʿ as evidence for determining religious rulings, this acceptance represents merely a formal similarity to the theory of consensus in the broader (non-Imāmī) scholarly tradition (al-Muzaffar, 1360, 2:87; al-Ghurayfī, 2014, 12). In light of this, it is evident that, according to the Shīʿa, ijmāʿ—being essentially a matter of agreement and unanimity—cannot, on its own, serve as a definitive proof. This is because ijmāʿ was instituted specifically for deriving religious rulings. Non-Shīʿī (general) jurists sometimes based ijmāʿ on definitive and explicit evidence, while at other times they relied on analogy or other non-authoritative speculative reasoning (zannī) (al-Ghurayfī, 2014, 13–14).

 

Scholars of uṣūl (principles of jurisprudence) have debated whether ijmāʿ derives its authority from the mere unanimity of opinion or from its grounding in textual evidence (naṣṣ). Shīʿī jurists argue that, unlike the Sunnī understanding of consensus, ijmāʿ can only be valid if it is based on a textual proof; otherwise, it holds no normative significance (al-Anṣārī, al-Mawsūʿat, 1:502). Furthermore, the Sunnī schools themselves are not unanimous regarding the Qurʾānic verses (al-Baqarah 2:143; Āl ʿImrān 3:110; an-Nisāʾ 5:115; at-Tawbah 9:16; Luqmān 31:15) and the interpretations of ḥadīth they cite as evidence for ijmāʿ (al-Anṣārī, 1415, 1:503).

 

The Shīʿī exegete Abū’l-Ḥusayn ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm al-Qummī (d. 307/919), in his commentary on verse 115 of Sūrat an-Nisāʾ—which Sunnī scholars often cite as proof for consensus—does not address the issue of ijmāʿ. According to Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī, the phrase “those who oppose the Messenger” (man yaʿṣi al-Rasūl) in this verse (an-Nisāʾ 5:115) refers not to the general Muslim community but specifically to Abū Taʿmah b. al-Ubayrak, who apostatized and fled to Mecca; the verse applies similarly to anyone who opposed Islam and joined the polytheists (al-Ṭūsī, 1424, 5:84).

 

Another point concerns the interpretation of the particle man (من) in the verse, which can convey a universalizing sense. According to some Imāmī authorities, the word ṣabīl (“path”) cannot signify all paths, nor can al-muʾminīn (“the believers”) signify all believers. If one were to adopt such a general interpretation, it could imply that those opposing the Prophet were disbelievers, while “believers” could include those who recognize the Maʿṣūm Imāms. Interpreted this way, the verse would refer not merely to the consensus of believers in a particular generation but to the cumulative consensus of all believers across all eras (al-Ṭūsī, 1424, 5:85). The generality of the expression necessitates this understanding. Even Sunnīs, if they limit the meaning to the believers of a specific generation, could, by the same logic, construe it as referring to those who believe in the Maʿṣūm Imām. After all, there is no certainty that they ceased to be believers; obedience to them presupposes their status as believers.

 

Al-Ṭūsī further adds that, as established by other proofs besides this verse, the threat mentioned in the verse is directed at the one who opposes the Prophet (al-Ṭūsī, 1424, 5:86). For more detailed discussions see (al-Ṭūsī, 1417, 2:605–612; al-Fayẓ al-Kāshānī, n.d., 1:462–463.

 

Shīʿī scholars reject the ḥadīth reports cited by their opponents as evidence for ijmāʿ, either on the grounds of their weak authenticity or by arguing that the meaning cannot be understood in the manner interpreted by Sunnī jurists. According to them, even in the hadith often cited among the proofs of ijmāʿ—“My Ummah will not unite upon error. If you encounter a disagreement, follow the side where the majority of Muslims (sawād al-aʿẓam) stand” (Ibn Mājah, Fitan, 8)—the term Ummah refers not to the general Muslim community but to those who are rightly guided. Shīʿīs argue that the Sunnī claim of a single rightly guided sect cannot be substantiated; in reality, the rightly guided group (al-Firqah al-muḥiqqah / al-Firqah al-Nājiyah) comprises the followers of the Ahl al-Bayt. Furthermore, the transmission of this hadith from Anas b. Mālik is weak, as noted in the Zawāʾid, due to the presence of Abū Khalaf al-Aʿmā in its chain (al-Anṣārī, 1415, 1:504).

 

Similarly, in the hadith frequently cited to demonstrate the authoritative nature of ijmāʿ—“Allah has protected you from three things: receiving the curse of your Prophet and being collectively destroyed, the oppressors prevailing over the rightly guided, and agreeing upon error (ijmāʿ upon misguidance)” (Abū Dāwūd, Fitan, 1; Dārimī, Muqaddimah, 8)—the common emphasis in both narrations is on the term dalālah (misguidance), which carries a more specific meaning than mere error. While error may signify simple mistake, dalālah entails sin and deviation from the right path (inhirāf).

 

Moreover, according to the intended meaning of both hadiths, not only the jurists participating in the consensus but the entire Ummah are described as being free from error, which would imply the infallibility (maʿṣūm) of the whole community. Since even for scholars such universal infallibility is impossible, it is clearly untenable to apply this to the entire Ummah. Shīʿī scholars interpret this issue from a distinct perspective, equating prophetic and Imāmic infallibility and attributing the ascription of infallibility to the Ummah in these reports to “the probable presence of the Maʿṣūm Imam within the community” (al-Anṣārī, 1415, 1:504–505).

 

According to Shīʿī scholars, even considering ijmāʿ as rationally possible poses significant difficulties. Although Qurʾānic verses use the second-person plural “you” and ḥadīth reports refer to “my Ummah,” indicating the consensus of the community of Muḥammad, al-Anṣārī raises objections by including members of other religious communities in his reasoning. He argues that to regard it as rationally impossible for knowledgeable and intelligent individuals to reach consensus in error would, by analogy, require that Jews, Christians, and adherents of other religions also never reach agreement in error—an untenable position. Their numerical superiority and their concurrence on matters contrary to Islam did not prevent them from erring or falling into misguidance. Similarly, philosophers have reached consensus on many issues using evidence, only to be proven mistaken later (al-Anṣārī, 1415, 1:505).

 

Hur al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1104/1693) provides a noteworthy response to the Sunnī approach of following the majority (sawād al-aʿẓam). He argues that the Qurʾān emphasizes that the numerical strength of nonbelievers does not confer validity. Furthermore, in both Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīth reports, praise (maḥḥ) is attributed to the minority, whereas criticism (dhamm) applies to the majority at the level of tawātur. In contrast, ijmāʿ represents only the widely recognized opinion, and the evidence supporting its authoritative status is incomplete. The actual realization of consensus during the Occultation is particularly difficult, and fully mastering the subject is nearly impossible. There is no proof that ijmāʿ should be restricted to those living in a particular period.

 

All details concerning this matter primarily belong to non-Shīʿī authorities (ʿāmmah), and none of these considerations provide legitimate or acceptable evidence. In Shīʿī sources, the statement “take the consensus among the Companions [of the Shīʿa], for there is no doubt in consensus” does not refer to absolute consensus, but rather to agreement on the specific issue under discussion. Regarding the differences between two reports on this point, Hur al-ʿĀmilī, like other Shīʿī scholars, maintains that ijmāʿ can only carry authority if it includes the view of the Maʿṣūm Imam. Therefore, ijmāʿ is not an independent proof; in cases of disagreement, it serves only as a rationale supporting the view of the Maʿṣūm (Sunna) (al-ʿĀmilī, n.d., 214).

 

Although the concept of ijmāʿ in Shīʿa and Sunnī thought may appear similar in name and form, its substantive content is entirely different. In Shīʿī perspective, ijmāʿ does not constitute an independent proof alongside the Qurʾān and Sunnah; rather, it derives its authority from revealing the Sunnah. In itself, ijmāʿ does not possess the attributes of infallibility (ʿiṣmah) or legal authority (ḥujjiyya). Since the Imāmiyya refers to the consensus of a small number of individuals, it cannot be designated as ijmāʿ in the technical sense. This consensus represents a definite agreement that manifests the view of the Maʿṣūm Imam and, by ruling, carries the status of consensus. Otherwise, the mere agreement of people on a matter would carry no value (al-Muzaffar, 1360, 3:103–104).

 

Moreover, the epistemic authority of mutawātir reports does not arise from the general infallibility of the community of Muḥammad but from the fact that the report encompasses the view of the Maʿṣūm Imam (al-Ṭūsī, 1417, 2:604, 612). In addition, those participating in the consensus must themselves be Shīʿīs. Since others do not hold the belief in the Maʿṣūm Imam, truth cannot be with them, nor can the Maʿṣūm Imam enter into agreement with those who do not believe in him (al-Murtaẓā, 1405, 1:15).

This is supported by Sūrat al-Aḥzāb, 33, which refers to the unanimity of the Ahl al-Bayt (al-Aḥzāb 33:33). God has purified the Ahl al-Bayt from impurities (riṣṣ). The use of the masculine pronoun (ʿankum) in the verse excludes the Prophet’s wives from the Ahl al-Bayt. In the ḥadīth, the term error refers to impurity (riṣṣ), which, according to the verse, cannot originate from the Ahl al-Bayt (al-Ṭūsī, 1424, 8:340–341).

 

2. Authorities of Ijmāʿ

2.1. The Prophet and the Maʿṣūm Imāms

Although infallibility (maʿṣūm), understood as protection from sin, is attributed only to prophets in the Sunnī tradition, the Shīʿa recognize thirteen individuals from the Ahl al-Bayt as Maʿṣūm. The first among them are ʿAlī and his wife Fāṭima, while the remaining twelve are the Imāms traditionally acknowledged by the Shīʿa. God created everything in existence out of respect for Muḥammad and his Ahl al-Bayt (Shaykh Ṣadūq, 1414, 93).

It should be noted, however, that neither the Qurʾān nor Sunnī ḥadīth sources provide information explicitly supporting the Imāmate theory. Moreover, this theory is categorically rejected by Sunnī Muslims.

 

2.1.1. The Theory of Imāmate and the Identity of the Imām

During the Umayyad period, the Shīʿa were subjected to intense political pressures. This environment facilitated the emergence of extreme ideas, and the first theory of Imāmate arose during this period. According to this theory, the Imāms had to be from the Ahl al-Bayt. Later, the theory was extended back to the time of the Prophet, developing into the belief that ʿAlī had been appointed as Caliph by God and that the Imāmate was restricted to his descendants. This theory first appeared in the city of Kūfa during the revolt led by Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740) in Hijri 122 against the Umayyad Caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 125/743) (al-Kātib, 2009, 228–229).

 

In later Shīʿī thought, for the sustainability of the Imāmate theory, it was accepted as established knowledge that “there must always exist a Maʿṣūm between God and His servants, and this is obligatory until the Day of Judgment” (al-ʿĀmilī, n.d., 141). The issue of the Imāmate and the appointment of Imāms by naṣṣ (divine designation) became not only the most significant point of divergence between the Shīʿa and their opponents but also the most challenging topic for persuading adversaries.

 

Initially, after the death of the eleventh Imām, Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (d. 260/874), the claim that he had a son—and that some of his followers mentioned this after his death—remained a secretive and esoteric view that was not fully accepted among the Shīʿa. During this period, many Shīʿa doubted the existence of the twelfth Imām and even accused one another of disbelief (al-Kātib, 2005, 147). Since Jaʿfar claimed the Imāmate after the death of his brother Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī, he was referred to among the Shīʿa as “Jaʿfar the Liar” (Jaʿfar al-Kazzāb) (Kılavuz, 1989, 2:394). The group that maintained, before Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī’s death, that he had a son is referred to as the IsnāʿAshariyya (Twelvers) (al-Kātib, 2005, 142–147).

 

2.1.2. The Attributes of the Imāms and the Source of Their Knowledge

Almost all Shīʿī authors have felt the need to address the issue of Imāmate in some form or to write independent works on the subject. Among these, the most comprehensive work is arguably the famous book by Abū’l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Qummī (d. 329/941), al-Imāma wa’t-Tabsira min al-Khayr. In this work, based on reports, some transmitted from the Prophet and most from the Imāms, he presents that the Prophet foretold the succession of twelve Imāms after him, the first being ʿAlī and the last being the Qaʾim/Mahdī. It was also reported that the Qaʾim would experience a period of concealment, during which people would be tested, and those who remained steadfast would be saved, while the deniers would belong to the people of Hell (al-Majlisī, 1983, 36:226–373). To support this belief, Shīʿī scholars cited numerous verses along with their reasons for revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl). According to a report transmitted by al-Qummī, Imām Riḍā (d. 203/818), the son of Mūsā al-Kāẓim (d. 183/799), interpreted the verse “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due” (an-Nisa. 4:58) in response to a question as a divine command whereby an Imām entrusts the responsibility to the next Imām after him (al-Qummī, 1987, 166).

 

Although its precise nature is not fully known, the Imāmiyya generally maintain that the Imām receives knowledge from God through a special, non-ordinary means. Unlike other scholars, the Imām possesses a unique connection with God in matters of religion; endowed with certain miracles, he receives revelation conveyed by an unseen angel. For this reason, the Imām is fully cognizant of all matters and constitutes the ultimate source of correct judgment in every issue. The Imāms acquire their knowledge in three ways: through oral transmissions, written reports, and by being muḥaddath, that is, recipients of divine communication (Kuzudişli, 2011, 86).

 

The Imāms are said to possess knowledge of the complete exegesis and interpretation of the Qurʾān, its abrogating and abrogated verses, as well as all forms of heavenly knowledge revealed to prophets and angels (al-Kulaynī, 1388, 1:253–255). The phrase “those firmly grounded in knowledge” in Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3:7) refers to ʿAlī and the other Imāms (al-ʿĀmilī, n.d., 144). No one other than the Imāms can fully comprehend the exegesis of the Qurʾān (al-ʿĀmilī, n.d., 173). It is even reported that the deeds of servants are presented daily to the Imāms, together with the Prophet (al-ʿĀmilī, n.d., 145).

 

Since the creation of the world, a just Imām has always existed as God’s proof (ḥujja), and the institution of waṣāya (divinely appointed succession) has passed from prophet to prophet beginning with Adam (Qummī, 1987, 153–155, 165–167), and will continue until the Day of Resurrection. Adam memorized the names of the Imāms, while Noah learned their number (Qummī, 1987, 145, 148).

 

The confusion arising from internal and external objections and doubts regarding the doctrine of Imāmate is also reflected in the language of the transmitted reports. According to these traditions, the Imāmate does not continue through paternal uncles, maternal uncles, or brothers (Qummī, 1987, 177, 179). Apart from Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, it cannot pass between two brothers (Qummī, 1987, 187–189). Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya (d. 81/700), although regarded as a Mahdī by some, is not considered an Imām (Qummī, 1987, 193–195). Likewise, ʿAbd Allāh (Qummī, 1987, 209), Ismāʿīl (Qummī, 1987, 207), and Jaʿfar are not Imāms (Qummī, 1987, 178). The Prophet reportedly informed ʿAlī of those who would share with him in the Imāmate, and he had these names written down for him. According to these accounts, it is through the Imāms that the community receives rain, that prayers are answered, and that calamities are warded off and divine mercy descends (Qummī, 1987, 183). The one who is to become Imām recognizes this at the final moment of the preceding Imām’s life. Gabriel is said to have come to the Prophet carrying a written document instructing him to appoint ʿAlī as his successor, along with a seal. Before dying, each Imām writes down the name of the next Imām and seals the document with this seal. This process will continue until the Day of Resurrection (Qummī, 1987, 166–167). Whoever dies without knowing the Imām of his time is deemed to have died the death of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, which implies dying upon disbelief, polytheism, hypocrisy, and misguidance (Qummī, 1987, 219–220). The Prophet is also reported to have prayed to God not to grant intercession to those who oppose the Imāms (Qummī, 1987, 174). A person who lives during the time of the Imām but fails to acknowledge him, though still considered a Muslim, is not a believer (Qummī, 1987, 229). Anyone who associates with an Imām—whom God has not appointed—another person as equal in authority has committed shirk against God (Qummī, 1987, 231). The Imāms also possess the scriptures revealed to previous prophets, and it is inconceivable that they should remain ignorant of any matter pertaining to revelation (al-Kulaynī, 1388, 1:227).

 

2.1.3. The Occulted Imām and the Means of Communicating with Him

Among the Imams elevated by the Shiʿa to the level of doctrinal belief, the most enigmatic figure is the Twelfth Imam, known as al-Qāʾim and al-Mahdī, who is identified as the Occulted Imam (al-Imām al-Ghāʾib). According to Shiʿi sources, the Occulted Imam shares certain characteristics with the prophets: like Moses, his birth was concealed and he remained hidden from his people for a period (Shaykh Ṣadūq, 1429, 2:374); like Joseph, he experienced a form of imprisonment; and like Jesus, he was said to have been declared dead despite not having died. Thus, in matters relating to occultation, al-Qāʾim is believed to embody attributes previously manifested by earlier prophets (Qummī, 1987, 234–35). It is asserted that those who attempt to determine the exact time of his appearance are liars; those who hasten will perish; and those who show submission will attain deliverance and ultimately meet the Imams (Qummī, 1987, 235–36). Another report attributed to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq interprets the Qurʾānic verse, “We shall certainly test you with something of fear and hunger and loss of wealth, lives, and fruits; but give good tidings to the patient” (Al-Imran 2:155), as referring to the period of al-Qāʾim’s occultation. Although some narrations maintain that it is impermissible to mention al-Qāʾim by his given name—claiming such knowledge to be among the hidden matters of the Prophet—other traditions explicitly state that his name and teknonymy correspond to those of the Prophet and that he most closely resembles him in character and appearance (Shaykh Ṣadūq, 1309, 2:411). Shiʿi reports also describe a number of signs that will precede the appearance and uprising of al-Qāʾim. Among these are the emergence of the Yamānī and the Sufyānī, the call of a herald from the heavens, the swallowing of an army by the earth in the region of al-Bayḍāʾ, and the killing of al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (Nuʿmānī, 2013, 184 [nos. 313, 315], 186 [no. 317], 188 [nos. 319–20], 191 [no. 325], 192 [no. 330]). Although, according to Sunni scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the notion of a Twelfth Imam never emerged during the lifetime of Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī and no such child was ever born (Ibn Taymiyya, 1986, 403), Shiʿi sources maintain that the birth of Imam al-Mahdī was concealed out of fear of Abbasid persecution. Despite his young age, he is said to have attended his father’s funeral and prevented his uncle Jaʿfar—who was claiming the imamate—from leading the prayer, taking his place before withdrawing again into occultation (al-Kātib, 2005, 177). It is further narrated that al-Qāʾim confronted his uncle Jaʿfar during a dispute over inheritance, saying, “What right have you to interfere with what belongs to me?” Similarly, when Jaʿfar attempted to bury their great-grandmother inside the house, al-Qāʾim reportedly appeared and asked, “O Jaʿfar, is this house yours?”, after which he disappeared again and was not seen by him thereafter (Shaykh Ṣadūq, 2018, 2:373–74). Despite the abundance of detailed reports concerning al-Qāʾim, the means of communicating with him have remained confined to elusive accounts and mystical narratives, leaving the nature of such interactions shrouded in secrecy.

 

Shīʿī scholars, while formulating the doctrines and jurisprudence of the Shīʿa, consistently maintained a degree of reservation toward the reports transmitted by the Companions—even when these Companions fulfilled the reliability criteria established by the hadith scholars and had personally seen or heard the Prophet. By contrast, they displayed greater tolerance toward reports transmitted by their own adherents, despite the fact that such transmitters should, in principle, be subject to the same standards of reliability. Yet the contradictions found among the reports attributed to the Imams were more numerous than the disagreements that emerged among Sunnī jurists themselves (Ṭūsī, 11417, 1/137–138).

 

The works composed by Shīʿī scholars on hadith methodology and biographical evaluation (rijāl) further illustrate this phenomenon. According to various reports found in the Ahl al-Bayt sources, whenever one of the Imams was alive and accessible, disputants could meet him directly, present their conflicting views, and determine the correct ruling based on the Imam’s statement. After the death of the eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī, the Imāmī community believed that communication with the twelfth Imam continued through correspondence and specially appointed emissaries. Indeed, during the first phase of occultation—known as the Minor Occultation (al-ghayba al-ṣughrā)—the Shīʿī community held that it could receive messages from the Imam through individuals recognized as his deputies. However, during the Major Occultation (al-ghayba al-kubrā), beginning in 329/940, the Imam—according to the final declaration transmitted by his last deputy—affirmed that he would no longer appoint any representative, nor would he meet anyone openly or communicate through a special messenger. In the period that followed, responding to objections raised by opponents and devising a method for resolving internal doctrinal and legal disagreements became a significant intellectual challenge and an important field of inquiry among Shīʿī scholars.

 

Imāmī scholars were compelled to devise a solution to this problem. In the fourth Islamic century, the prominent Imāmī theologian al-Mufīd displayed a distinct tendency to rely on theological arguments and rational inference—especially in matters that, in principle, required reliance on naṣṣ. This methodological inclination became even more pronounced in the works of his student al-Murtaẓā, particularly due to the rejection of khabar al-wāḥid. As a consequence, ijmāʿ began to occupy an increasingly central place as a means of resolving questions that should have been determined through naṣṣ. Al-Mufīd—and, following him, his two major disciples al-Murtaẓā and al-Ṭūsī—did not allow solitary reports (khabar al-wāḥid) to take precedence over reason, and the three shared the same view regarding the probative value (ḥujjiyya) of ijmāʿ, devoting considerable space to the subject in their writings. Shīʿī scholars, although aligned with the Muʿtazila and opposed to Ahl al-Sunna on certain theological questions unrelated to the Imamate, adopted a position on ijmāʿ that set them at odds with all other schools. While al-Murtaẓā did not consider khabar al-wāḥid sufficient proof in matters of legal rulings, he introduced an exception in the case of ijmāʿ. In his view, there had to exist some means of maintaining contact with the Imām, and such contact had to occur in a manner equivalent to tawātur, leaving no room for objection or contradiction. Al-Murtaẓā thus argued that this could be achieved through ijmāʿ—specifically, an ijmāʿ in which the Imām himself was believed to be included (al-Murtaẓā, Rasāʾil, 1:213). Although the Imām whose existence was an article of faith remained unknown and concealed, he was still believed to be alive. Therefore, Shīʿī scholars held that, for the community to benefit from his guidance in intellectual and social matters, it was unnecessary to hear his opinion directly or receive it through tawātur. Rather, in periods during which the Imām was hidden and all means of direct communication with him were severed, the only viable method for determining his view was through an ijmāʿ in which his participation was deemed certain—and this became the accepted position (al-Murtaẓā, 1405, 1:11). However, it was not considered valid to treat the consensus of only known scholars as definitive proof. An ijmāʿ could function as evidence only if the Imām was included among the group, even if unrecognized. This notion simultaneously supported the belief in the Imām’s continued existence and elevated ijmāʿ to the status of a binding religious proof. Yet once formalized, the theory generated a highly complex set of problems. There were no definitive criteria by which one could determine whether the Imām had actually participated in a given ijmāʿ. Moreover, based on a presupposition, scholars assumed that the Imām must necessarily be part of the ijmāʿ; and this assumption—despite being based on conjecture rather than any explicit or mass-transmitted textual evidence—was treated as equivalent to tawātur. In other words, a purely rational presumption, not even supported by a khabar al-wāḥid (a person's khabar), came to be regarded as possessing the epistemic weight of tawātur because of the doctrinal presuppositions of the school. Was this not a contradiction? According to al-Murtaẓā, the answer was straightforward: if one possesses knowledge that is certain and leaves no room for doubt, the absence of detailed information does not undermine the certainty of that knowledge. A person may know with certainty the existence of many established facts while lacking full knowledge of their particulars; such ignorance does not diminish the certainty of the facts themselves. Information concerning cities, lands, major historical events, and well-known rulers functions in this way. For example, someone who has never seen Basra or Kufa, yet knows with certainty that they exist, or someone who knows that the Battle of Badr or the Battle of Ṣiffīn occurred, may be unable to provide a detailed explanation if asked how they are certain of these events. Similarly, the Imām’s inclusion in the ijmāʿ was, for al-Murtaẓā, a matter whose occurrence was certain, even if its particulars remained unknown. In his writings, he sought to clarify that the certainty of the Imām’s participation—and the impossibility of fully demonstrating its details—did not compromise the validity of this knowledge. He illustrated his argument with additional analogies to reinforce this point (al-Murtaẓā, 1405, 1:12–14).

 

While explaining how one can recognize a report that originates from God, al-Murtaẓā identifies several distinctive features—foremost among them the extraordinary inimitability (iʿjāz) manifested in the Qurʾān’s unparalleled eloquence and rhetorical perfection, which no human speech can match (al-Murtaẓā, 11405, 1:10–11). Since the divine speech has reached us through tawātur, there is no disagreement regarding its capacity to yield certain knowledge (ʿilm) and to function as binding proof (ḥujja). In contrast, establishing the words of the Maʿṣūm—whether the Prophet or the Imām—in a manner that yields certain knowledge is possible only by directly hearing their statements from their own mouths. For later generations, the only way for the Imām’s statements to provide certain knowledge is for those statements to be transmitted through tawātur. Thus, when issuing a legal judgment, if neither the apparent meaning (ẓāhir) of the Qurʾān nor any mutawātir report from the Prophet or the Imāms can be cited as evidence, recourse must be made to the ijmāʿ of the scholars. For this reason, according to al-Murtaẓā, even when the Imām’s individual view cannot be identified, once his participation in the ijmāʿ is presumed, the ijmāʿ becomes—by itself—a fully sufficient proof in all matters for which no other evidence exists (al-Murtaẓā, 1405, 1:16–17).

 

Although determining whether the Imām’s view is present within an instance of ijmāʿ ultimately rests on ijtihād and therefore remains relative and probabilistic (ẓannī), this did not constitute a significant problem for the Shīʿī scholars. Otherwise, they would have had to concede that the Maʿṣūm Imām neither identifies nor corrects the errors of the scholars who follow him, and that he remains unconcerned with the affairs of the Shīʿī community. From another perspective, the Maʿṣūm Imām’s silence regarding a matter on which ijmāʿ has formed was interpreted as an indication that the scholars’ ijtihād was sound. In other words, this was analogous to taqrīr al-sunna in the methodology of the hadith scholars: the Prophet’s tacit approval when witnessing an action. The notion that the Imām’s silence signifies approval already existed within early Imāmī thought (al-Mufīd, 1993, 107). While al-Murtaẓā referred to this principle as the participation of the “unknown lineage” (majhūl al-nasab) Imām in ijmāʿ, his student al-Ṭūsī later termed it “the consensus of divine grace” (al-ijmāʿ al-luṭfī). According to al-Ṭūsī’s formulation, if the scholars were to commit an error, the Imām would be required—by virtue of divine grace—to intervene and rectify it. Moreover, to deny that the Imām appears and participates in the formation of ijmāʿ would be tantamount to rejecting ijmāʿ itself (al-Ṭūsī, 1417, 2:631). Accepting the report concerning ijmāʿ as mutawātir—namely, affirming that the Imām necessarily participates in the ijmāʿ of the Shīʿī scholars—effectively resolved the issue for those who upheld this doctrine. Consequently, once a person accepts the tawātur-level certainty of such participation, giving credence to any opposing hadith becomes inconceivable.

 

According to Murtazā, there was no doubt that the Imām’s opinion belonged not to the ijmāʿ of the Muslim community at large, but exclusively to the ijmāʿ of the Imāmiyya. For there existed numerous proofs indicating that the truth resided with this group (the Imāmiyya). Murtazā articulated his views on this matter in a manner that could justifiably be deemed dogmatic: “The school of the Imām—whom we trust never to depart from the truth nor rely on anything other than the truth—is, without doubt, the school of this group (the Imāmiyya). For there exists no other true (school) besides it. We know that, due to the Imām’s occultation and his being indistinguishable from other people, his school is first and foremost the school of the people of knowledge and the people of divine unity, and thereafter the school of the whole community of Islam. We also know that the proofs indicate which school is correct and that the others are corrupt. Accordingly, whatever is said concerning the Imām follows the same line. From what has been stated, it becomes apparent that when the Imāmiyya reach ijmāʿ on a view or a legal school, they do so only upon the truth. For if they reach ijmāʿ on any matter, this necessarily means that the view of the Imām—and of all scholars belonging to them—is included within that ijmāʿ…” (Murtazā, 1405, 1/15–16).

 

However, this understanding—namely, that the Imām must have participated in ijmāʿ and that, consequently, a report based on ijmāʿ attains the level of tawātur—was not, in practice, as easily justifiable as it might appear in theory. Accepting an ijmāʿ founded on analogy (qiyās) or abstract reasoning (mujarrad ijtihād) as equivalent to tawātur did not fully align with the principle that ijmāʿ should be grounded in naṣṣ. After all, the ijmāʿ of the general community (ʿāmm) had occasionally been criticized precisely because it was sometimes based on analogy or independent reasoning.

 

Murtazā sought to overcome this problem by asserting that the Masūm must necessarily participate in ijmāʿ on matters lacking naṣṣ, thereby ensuring that the ijmāʿ of the Sunnah could be regarded with an unassailable certainty. On the one hand, Murtazā rejected the reports of those who had personally witnessed the Prophet or the Imāms on the grounds that solitary reports (khabar al-wāḥid) only express conjecture (zann), and he also did not give weight to the ijmāʿ of the majority of the community. On the other hand, he treated differing reports concerning the ijmāʿ of the Imāmiyya—while accepting that the Imām participated in ijmāʿ—as effectively achieving tawātur through rational-theological inference (istidlāl kalāmī). This precondition, which lacked direct textual support (naṣṣ), contained an internal tension, but for Murtazā it served as a necessary theoretical device to secure the authority and reliability of ijmāʿ within the Imāmiyya.

 

2.2. Companions of the Ijmāʿ (Ashābu’l-Ijmāʿ/ اصحاب الاجماع)

Within Shīʿa scholarship, the claim regarding a group whose transmitted reports are considered authentic (تَصْحِيحُ مَا يَصِحُّ عَنْهُمْ) and who are designated as Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ was first introduced by al-Kashshī (3rd–4th/9th–10th century) (al-Ghurayfī, n.d., 37, 41). Neither before him nor among his contemporaries is it known that anyone else articulated this claim, yet it remained one of the most significant problems in Shīʿa hadith methodology. According to al-Kashshī, there was consensus among the Shīʿa regarding the acceptance of the narrations transmitted by those deemed competent as jurists. Although some disagreed, the dominant view held that even if the narrators among this group were morally questionable or accused of fabricating hadiths, the reports were nonetheless considered authentic (Ghurayfī, n.d., 38; Kutluay, 2012, 267). Since it was believed that these narrations came only from trustworthy individuals, even mursal khabar (hadith) were treated as musnad (Ghurayfī, n.d., 41). After al-Kashshī, the issue of Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ remained debated regarding who precisely belonged to this group (Ghurayfī, n.d., 42); however, prominent scholars such as al-Murtazā, Ṭūsī, Najāshī (d. 450/1058), Ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1266), Ibn Dāwūd (d. 707/1307), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Āmilī (Shahīd I) (d. 786/1384), and Zayn al-Dīn b. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Jubbāʾī al-Āmilī (Shahīd II) (d. 966/1559 [?]) also addressed the issue (Ghurayfī, Kawāʿidu’l-Ḥadīth, 42). Excluding the twenty-two names cited by al-Nūrī and twenty-three cited by Ibn Dāwūd, the number of Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ recognized was eighteen. Among those accepted as Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ, six witnessed the time of Muḥammad al-Bāqir, six the period of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, and six witnessed the era of Mūsā al-Kāẓim (Abū Ibrāhīm) and his son ʿAlī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (d. 203/818) and participated in their gatherings (Ghurayfī, n.d., 38–39). Some even witnessed the times of two Imāms. The complication arises because certain individuals included in this group were jarḥed (criticized) by Shīʿa scholars. For instance, Ṭūsī asserts that ʿAbd Allāh b. Bukayr belonged to the Fataḥiyya (Hillī, 1964), 199–200). Aware of this, Zayn al-Dīn b. ʿAlī al-Āmilī (Shahīd II) also criticized Ibn Bukayr’s transmission from Zurāra, stating: “His transmission from Zurāra was because those around him did not trust him in issuing legal opinions. He did this to support his own school of thought” (Ghurayfī, n.d., 43). Thus, Ṭūsī's claim that “Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ does not transmit from unreliable narrators and does not narrate hadiths from others” did not reflect the truth. In fact, it is established that individuals such as Muḥammad b. Abū Umayr (d. 217/832) and others transmitted reports from weak narrators. Al-Kashshī himself criticized individuals like Ḥākim b. Utayba and Zakariyyā b. Yaḥyā, yet Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ also transmitted reports from them. Similarly, the qāḍī of Rey, ʿAmr b. Jamīʿ al-Azdī, had comparable transmissions. Among the narrators of Ashāb al-Ijmāʿ, there were also unknown figures such as Ḥākim al-Aʿmā (Ünalan, 2021, 63).

The consensus (ijmāʿ), which means that Muslim scholars reach agreement on a particular issue, is considered a religious proof by Shīʿī/Imāmī scholars to have emerged with the selection of the first caliph following the death of the Prophet. While there were examples of consultation (shūrā) on political and social matters during the lifetime of the Prophet, these do not constitute ijmāʿ in the juristic sense. This is because in matters of legal rulings (ahkām) that the Prophet declared “Allah commands,” decision-making through consultation or consensus is not applicable. Shīʿī scholars share this view. However, among the Shīʿa, the established classical cases of ijmāʿ are those reported by the Ashābu’l-ijmāʿ and believed to be linked to the Imāms. According to this understanding, fully developed by the third and fourth centuries AH, the first ijmāʿ issues traced back to the Imāms are considered equivalent to mutawātir khabar, and any opposing hadith must be categorically rejected. This is because it is believed that the Imām/Maṣṣūm definitely participated in these consensuses, and any contradictory report would imply a contradiction with the Maṣṣūm himself, which is incompatible with the belief in Imāmah.

 

Although ijmāʿ literally means the opinion of the majority, for the Shīʿa it is the consensus of the khāṣṣ (the special group, i.e., themselves) rather than the ʿāmm (the general populace) that carries evidentiary weight. According to the Shīʿa, the ijmāʿ of the general public either constitutes mere consensus not based on the Qurʾān and Sunnah (nass) or relies on khabar’s from the majority of companions who were fāsiq (sinful) or murtadd (apostate) and did not meet the criteria of sikkah (reliability). In contrast, a consensus in which none of the Maṣṣūmīn participated cannot be considered authoritative. From the defensive perspective represented by Ḥur al-ʿĀmilī, the opponents’ position that “one must follow the majority (savād al-aʿẓam)” is incorrect. For him, while the Qurʾān emphasizes the insignificance of numerical superiority among the disbelievers, the merit of the minority and the demerit of the majority are both affirmed to the level of tawātur (continuous transmission) in verses and reports. Ijmāʿ, however, represents only the famous opinion. Moreover, the evidentiary basis of ijmāʿ is not complete. Especially during the period of ghaybah (occultation), the realization of ijmāʿ is difficult, and full mastery over the topic is almost impossible. There is also no proof that ijmāʿ should be confined to those living in a particular era. All responsible beings—humans and jinn, past and future—fall under the concept of ummah. Ijmāʿ cannot be restricted solely to the ahl al-ḥāl wa al-ʿaqd (those in positions of authority or contractual responsibility). Every detail discussed in this context belongs entirely to the general public, and none of it constitutes valid evidence. Alongside Ḥur al-ʿĀmilī’s views, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the Shīʿa have not even a single matter on which they are unanimously agreed among themselves. On the other hand, Shīʿī scholars may acknowledge that on issues where the Shīʿa and Ahl al-Sunnah coincide, “the ijmāʿ of the ummah is likewise established.”

According to Shīʿa scholars, among the total of 110 classical (kadim) ijmāʿ issues, matters of ʿaqīdah (creed) are comparatively few, aside from the question of imāmah. Some of these issues are specific to the Imāmīyyah school. While certain rulings conflict with Qurʾānic verses or the hadiths transmitted from the Prophet, others are in agreement with the Ahl al-Sunnah’s ijmāʿ.

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